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Acting on a proposal developed by its Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Security Council on 24 May 2017 adopted a resolution on countering terrorist narratives. Adopted unanimously, Security Council resolution 2354 (2017) features a new framework including concrete guidelines that the Council urges Member States to follow, thereby amplifying positive and credible alternatives to audiences vulnerable to extremist messages.
Through the resolution, which was co-sponsored by close to 60 delegations, the Council welcomed the Committee’s “Comprehensive international framework to counter terrorist narratives” (S/2017/375), which had been submitted shortly before. While urging Member States to follow the guidelines outlined in the text, they were also called upon to respect the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter, including respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of all States.
 Security Council adopts resolution 2354 (2017).
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On 26 June 2017, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube announced the formation of the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, an initiative to make their hosted consumer services hostile to terrorists and violent extremists.
“I welcome this major initiative, which elevates our existing private-public partnership with these and other companies,” said United Nations Assistant Secretary-General Jean-Paul Laborde, Executive Director of the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED). CTED leads ‘Tech Against Terrorism’ (www.techagainstterrorism.org) together with the foundation ICT4Peace.
“Terrorism is a global threat that can only be defeated by sustained, joint efforts. The United Nations remains committed to addressing the scourge of terrorism, and we look forward to remaining a key partner to the private sector. The Security Council remains seized of this and other issues that represent serious threats to international peace and security, and its adoption last month of resolution 2354 (2017) provides a comprehensive international framework to counter terrorist narratives,” Mr. Laborde added.
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Security Council resolution 2322, adopted at the end of 2016, seeks to enhance international judicial and law enforcement cooperation in order to strengthen the international response to terrorism. The resolution underlines the importance of strengthening international cooperation, including by investigators, prosecutors, and judges, in order to prevent, investigate, and prosecute terrorist acts; it sets forth new requirements for promoting cooperation at the global, regional, subregional, and cross-regional levels.
Opening remarks during special meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on 21 June 2017.
This resolution accords a central role to the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and its Executive Directorate (CTED) in identifying gaps and trends in international cooperation among Member States, facilitating capacity-building, and working with key partners to promote its implementation. The Council has also requested CTED to prepare a report on the current state of international law enforcement and judicial cooperation in counter-terrorism matters, identify major gaps, and provide the Committee with recommendations on how to address these.
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Since January 2016, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, or Da’esh) has remained under continuous military pressure and experienced several setbacks in the Syrian Republic and in Iraq. The number of ISIL fighters is estimated to have diminished to between 12,000 and 20,000. It is nevertheless critical for Member States to remain vigilant, as the active and increasingly transnational threat that this and other terrorist groups represent continues to severely undermine international peace and security. These are among the key points from the Secretary-General’s 5th report on The threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat.Published on 31 May 2017, the report (S/2017/467) was submitted as a follow-up to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015), which requests the Secretary-General to submit updates every four months on the threat that ISIL represents to the international community and the principles and values of the Charter of the United Nations.
Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed the Security Council on the report.
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On behalf of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, CTED conducted a three-day follow-up visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina, from 18 to 20 April 2017, to discuss its progress in implementing Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) and Council resolution 2178 (2014), on stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs).
UN CTED delegation during the visit.
The discussions with the Government focused on legislation and judicial practice, counter-financing of terrorism, law enforcement, border control, international cooperation, countering violent extremism that leads to terrorism, the role of women in countering terrorism and violent extremism, and the need for rule-of-law-based responses to terrorism.Continue reading
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The Security Council has repeatedly stressed the importance of preventing terrorists from accessing weapons. Its resolution 1373 (2001) requires States to refrain from providing any form of support to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists.
However, because of the constantly evolving nature of the operational terrorist environment, denying terrorists access to weapons is a complex and multifaceted challenge.
 Open briefing of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on 17 May 2017.
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Terrorism has a face – and it is the face of its victims, whether one or in the thousands. Ultimately, our efforts to counter terrorism should be devoted to the restoration of the honour, memory, and dignity of all victims of terrorism, as well as to bringing the perpetrators to justice.” These words were pronounced by Assistant Secretary-General and Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) Mr. Jean-Paul Laborde on 2 May 2017 on the occasion of the unveiling at CTED of a plaque dedicated to the memory of victims and survivors of terrorism around the world.
The plaque dedicated to the victims and survivors of terrorism, located in UN CTED office.
The initiative is in line with Security Council resolution 2129 (2013), which expresses its “profound solidarity with the victims of terrorism and their families, and encourages CTED to take into account the important role that victims and survivor networks can play in countering terrorism”. The ceremony was attended by survivors of terrorism as well as the Deputy Permanent Representatives of Spain and of the United States of America to the United Nations, who joined CTED in observing a minute’s silence in memory of all victims of terrorism.
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Under Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), Member States are required to undertake measures to deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist attacks. This obligation requires Member States to take a number of steps, including legislative measures on criminalisation and jurisdiction. In addition, the Security Council has called on Member States to take appropriate measures, in conformity with international law, before granting refugee status, to ensure that an asylum-seeker has not planned, facilitated, or participated in the commission of terrorist acts. According to the UN Refugee Convention, protection may not be afforded to any person if there are serious reasons for considering that he or she has committed such acts.
Open briefing of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on 5 April 2017.
In practice, however, Member States face a number of challenges in meeting these obligations, including limited resources, porous borders, insufficient information sharing, and lack of a regional framework for cooperation in criminal matters. In situations where asylum-seekers constitute part of a large influx of migrants, Member States often encounter difficulties in identifying such persons in a timely manner. Screening is often conducted in an ad hoc manner with minimal, if any, reference to national and international watch lists.
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On 30 March 2017, the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) received a joint briefing from its Executive Directorate (CTED) and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, or UN Women. The briefing focused on efforts to advance the implementation of Security Council resolution 2242 (2015) in the context of the Committee’s work on counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism, especially as it pertains to the roles of women.
"The complex dynamic of the contemporary threat “underscores that we cannot cast women in any one role – they are perpetrators, supporters, victims,” said Lakshmi Puri, Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) of UN Women, in her briefing to the Committee.
Lakshmi Puri, Assistant Secretary-General of UN Women.
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From 27 to 29 March 2017, the Counter-Terrorism Committee – represented by its Executive Directorate (CTED) – conducted a follow-up visit to Senegal. The aim of the official visit was threefold: To (1) monitor the implementation by Senegal of recommendations made following the Committee’s 2009 visit; (2) monitor the implementation by Senegal of relevant requirements of Security Council resolutions 1624 (20015), 2178 (2014), and 2322 (2016); and (3) identify new technical assistance needs and areas in which Senegal might benefit from technical assistance to meet its obligations pursuant to the resolutions mentioned above, as well as good practices that might be shared with other Member States.
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CTED political analysis and research digest
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The Security Council, in its resolution 2129 (2013), asked CTED to “identify emerging issues, trends and developments related to resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014),” and to do so by enhancing its partnerships, among others, with research institutions, think-tanks, and academia. Most of the papers highlighted below have been published by members of the “CTED Global Counter-Terrorism Research Network.” All information included in the PAR Weekly Research Digest is provided for information purposes only and does not necessarily constitute the views or opinions of CTED.
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International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, April 2017
- Identity movements are oriented toward establishing the legitimacy of a collective group (organised on the basis of geography, religion, ethnicity or other prima facie commonalities).
- We should listen carefully to what extremists say they believe, but we should understand that their explanations cannot be objective or complete. In identity-based extremist movement, adherents have a patently obviously and deeply ingrained bias toward understanding and representing their ideology as uniquely virtuous and accurately representative of a wider social grouping. In order to effectively design policies and programs to counter radicalisation into violence, we must therefore approach the problem both individually and holistically, by understanding the broader dynamics that shape specific beliefs. Perhaps most importantly, we must understand that extremist ideology is the outcome of a group radicalisation process, rather than being exclusively causal.
- When extremists adherents present their ideology, they frequently argue for its absolute primacy and (in the case of fundamentalist movements) its immutability. But the development of ideological movements is messy and non-linear, and the contents of ideology are volatile, a phenomenon clearly visible in the evolution of British Israelism and seen more recently in the emergency of the so-called Islamic State (IS) from its precursor movement, al Qaeda.
- For understandable reasons, the study and analysis of violent extremism has long been fixated on the specific content of extremist ideologies. But this cannot and should not be the beginning and the end of analysis. Ideologies change, sometimes within a consistent organisational structure, and sometimes as one group or movement mutates into another.
- In texts, the process of escalation can be mapped through linkages between concepts and the bundling of multiple linkages into single conceptual constructs. These mappings can inform efforts to counter extremist messaging.
- Escalating demands for legitimacy can be measured by shifting temporal frames, expanding from present-day contexts to seek justification in history and set expectations for the future (often in the form of religious prophecy).
- Movements become extreme when the in-group’s demand for legitimacy escalates to the point it can only be satisfied at the expense of an out-group.
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ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey, May 2017
- Despite spending upwards of two trillion dollars to eradicate al-Qaeda, the world faces a worse problem than it did in 2001. Clearly, something is not working. The findings of this year’s ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey offer a window of what might be missing in the equation.
- The respondents in the survey highlighted the steps needed to fight extremism. They saw five top priorities: military action, educational reform,job, media campaigns to expose the Islamic State ideology as a distortion of Islamic teachings, and reforming religious institutions to fight extremism. Failure to listen to these voices will only perpetuate the problem.
- It is a mistake to measure success against extremist groups by how much territory gained back from them. Such assessments often cloud judgement about the true strength or relevance of these groups. The fight against extremism must seek to address the grievances that created the space for extremists to operate and present themselves as defenders of these communities.
- To defeat the Islamic State and terrorism, the U.S. and its allies in the region have to do much more than the use of force […]. These groups can be defeated in the battlefield but their eradication requires a broader effort. These groups exist because of underlying problems that drive people to join or support them.
- Another key finding is the noticeable rise in anti-American views. A majority of youth in eight Arab countries now consider the United State their enemy, up from four countries a year ago.
- The crisis in Iraq is poised to worsen as the battles against the Islamic State in Iraq is eclipsed by the pessimism that Iraqis expressed towards their government and its ability to provide jobs and better education after the Islamic State is defeated.
- There is an obvious divergence between expectation and reality in Iraq, and this should worry any policymaker dealing with the threat of terrorism in the region and beyond. The government in Iraq is facing one of the worst humanitarian crises in recent history, coupled with economic stagnation and low oil prices.
- Concerns about unemployment has increased since 2016, with young Iraqis expressing strongest concerns.
- Among the most critical parts of the survey is the importance young Arabs placed on the need to go beyond military action in the fight against the Islamic State and terrorism – especially as that group has weakened over the past year. Education reform and providing well-paying jobs are seen as just as important as military operations.
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International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, June 2017
- Outlined are four main threats related to the issue of foreign fighters: the travel of foreign fighters, their return to their countries of residence, the threat posed by lone actors and sympathisers who carry out attacks at home, and finally, an increasing polarisation of society.
- The Travel of Foreign Fighters to Conflict Theatres
The number of foreign fighters leaving to join the group is decreasing. However, as of October 2016, 15,000 foreign fighters were estimated to remain in Syria and Iraq. The question of why foreign fighter travel poses a threat remains relevant.
The primary fear of governments is that the travel of foreign fighters contributes to their radicalisation and acquisition of capabilities to carry out terrorist attacks. […] They also establish links to jihadist organisations worldwide.
With IS’ power in Syria and Iraq decreasing, foreign fighters may also choose to travel to third countries and join other conflicts in places where thorough surveillance is impossible, as is the case with Libya, which has seen an increased influx of foreign fighters over the past two years.
- The Return of Foreign Fighters to their Countries of Residence
Motivations of returning foreign fighters are diverse. While some are disillusioned with terrorist practices and life in conflict zones, others may return with the aim of carrying out terrorist attacks, with reports suggesting that IS may systematically export terror cells to Europe.
Returnees may also pose a threat if they do not plan to carry out attacks themselves, but initiate or engage in logistical, financial, or recruitment cells, or become leaders in extremist societies. More practically, returnees may be involved in the facilitation of travel of new foreign fighters.
While the export of terror may not be the primary goal of most returnees, they may continue to pose a threat mainly by upholding and performing secondary functions within extremist networks.
- Attacks by Lone Actors and IS Sympathisers
Plots by IS sympathisers can be considered a threat for two reasons: they are more frequent and more likely to come to execution than plots involving returned foreign fighters. At the same time, it is difficult for security services to track the activities of such individuals, making their behaviour highly unpredictable. Increasingly, IS has sought to exploit this weakness by calling on its supporters to carry out attacks at home if they cannot travel to the caliphate.
[…] IS is believed to rely on a network of “virtual planners” to groom remote sympathisers into potential attackers and transmit operational and technical knowledge. This strategy of relying on facilitators to inspire and direct attacks remotely may become more central to IS’ modus operandi in the future, due to the organisation’s increasing need to adapt to territorial loss.
- Social Polarisation
High profile terrorist attacks targeting European cities, the refugee crisis and concomitant rise of populist sentiment across Europe are creating societal fault lines across the continent.
Terrorist activities of Europeans on European soil, in particular, are thought to negatively affect cohesion in society, fostering extremism and a vicious circle of violence and counter-violence.
It is important to recognise that these tensions in society may foster radicalisation.
- The four threat dimensions should be acknowledged as mutually reinforcing parts of the same problem. Tackling them thus requires considerations of the unwanted impact that policies targeting one may have on the others.
- Defining the problem in a one-dimensional way – as mainly concerning either foreign fighter travel, returnees, lone actors or social polarisation – not only disregards the dynamic at play but, more importantly, renders potential remedies ineffective.
- The only way to protect society from this increasing threat is to adopt a holistic approach that takes into account and addresses the multiple dimensions.
- Failure to adopt a holistic approach will, at best, simply not provide protection from all aspects of the threat, and, at worst, fail to identify both the unintended consequences of one-dimensional policy approaches and the displacement effect on terrorist actions.
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The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, June 2017
- The Tehran attacks were separate but simultaneous, and the Islamic State immediately claimed responsibility; according to al-Naba, two militants attacked the mausoleum and three others stormed the parliament, filming this part of the operation and later releasing the footage.
- The attacks, three months after the release of the 36-minute Salman al-Farsi video and at a time when its caliphate in Iraq and Syria is crumbling, signal a focus for the Islamic State on Iran as a critical battlefield.
- A declaration of war against Iran is unprecedented in jihadist history. Even though Iranian proxies have been featured prominently in the propaganda of both the Islamic State and jihadists affiliated to al-Qaeda in Syria, Iran had been out of focus as an explicit target for these groups.
- There are three aims for the Tehran attacks. First, the group seeks to “refute” frequent accusations of collaboration with the Iranians. In the video shot before the twin operation, the speaker stressed that the group was not an agent to Iran or Saudi Arabia, after threatening further attacks against the two countries.
- He was addressing common critique from fellow jihadists, ordinary people, and even politicians that the lack of attacks against Iran since the group’s establishment, despite the proximity, was an indication of collaboration. Also, mentioning Saudi Arabia was also an attempt to defend the group against accusations in Iran of being a Saudi proxy.
- The second aim is rivalry with al-Qaeda. Since the establishment of the caliphate in 2014, the Islamic State has sought to replace al-Qaeda and present itself as the leader of global jihad. Al-Adnani’s speech, the release in March, and the attacks this month are framed as a repudiation of al-Qaeda’s credibility in the jihadist worldview.
- Related to the second reason is the continuing aim of tapping into the niche market of sectarianism in the Middle East. The Islamic State, unlike Al-Qaeda, has no qualms in targeting Shi’a mosques and ordinary Shi’a civilians.
- The Islamic State will focus on sectarianism to maintain and expand its relevance as it loses control of its territories in Iraq and Syria.
- The aim of the Islamic State’s attacks in Iran is not to threaten the Iranian state and force authorities to dial down their role in countries like Iraq and Syria. On the contrary, the Islamic State hopes for a more pronounced Iranian role in the region. The target audience is not Iran, but people in the region who increasingly view Iran as an enemy.
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Institute for Security Studies, May 2017
- In 2014 the reach of international extremism became evident when reports emerged of South Africans travelling to the Middle East to join the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
- While South Africa has not experienced a terrorist attack in over a decade, it is not immune to the global challenges posed by violent extremism.
- South Africa has been linked to al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda and, more recently, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, with 60–100 South Africans estimated to have joined the group.
- The country also has a history of violent extremism stemming from domestic grievances that remain prevalent, with the last known plot thwarted in 2012 when a far-right group planned an attack on the African National Congress’ National Conference in Manguang.
- While the threats previously posed by domestic extremist groups have diminished, new concerns have emerged relating to international extremist groups.
- The changing nature of extremist groups should particularly be monitored. With the loss of territory in Iraq and Syria and the increasing difficulty of perpetrating attacks in Europe or the US, ISIS may look to expand its range of operations.
- This may make countries such as South Africa more attractive options with relatively high-value targets, such as various Western interests and symbols representative of capitalism or ‘Western imperialism,’ that may be easier to target than heavily protected European countries or the US.
- There is, however, little indication that this is currently the case and the threat of violent extremism in South Africa is still considered to be low.
- The conditions that have been shown to lead to extremism in other countries are prevalent in South Africa. The availability of weapons and explosives means that the threat posed by international extremist groups is largely a question of intent, which was previously found to be lacking.
- While the issue should be taken seriously and monitored, other issues may take priority over violent extremism. South Africa’s high crime rate is one such issue.
- South Africa should, however, not become complacent. Although the threat appears to be minimal, the far-reaching ramifications of a potential attack mean that it should be considered seriously and carefully monitored.
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